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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this petition pursuant to 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) and § 35-1-86 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Did the Industrial Commission err in granting Mr. Broadbent 
interest on his permanent partial disability award from the date 
his disability impairment rating was determined by a medical 
panel when, up to that point, many doctors had been unable to 
agree on his impairment rating and his condition had not 
stabilized? 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute and rule are controlling: 
1. Section 35-1-78 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended): 
Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award-
-Authority to destroy records—Interest on award—No 
authority to change statutes of limitation. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission 
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from 
the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise 
become due and payable. 
2. Rule 490-1-12B.2. U.A.C. (1991) Interest. 
* * * 
For the purpose of interest calculation, 
benefits shall become "due and payable" (as used 
in Section 35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows: 
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2. Permanent partial compensation shall be 
due and payable on the next day following the 
termination of a temporary total disability. 
However, where the condition is not fixed for 
rating purposes, the interest shall commence from 
the date the permanent partial impairment can be 
medically determined. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition Below. 
This case is a claim by an injured worker for additional 
interest on his permanent partial disability compensation award. 
The ALJ awarded petitioner, Mr. Broadbent, interest from the date 
that a medical panel ascertained his disability rating. Prior to 
that time, several doctors, including Mr. Broadbentfs treating 
physicians, had been unable to agree as to his disability rating, 
and his condition had not become stable. Both parties asked the 
Industrial Commission to review the Order of the ALJ.1 The 
Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ on the interest issue. 
The Commission held that, under the applicable statute and rule, 
interest was due from the date the liability of the respondents 
was first medically determined. (A copy of the Commission's 
Order is attached hereto as Addendum A.) 
Mr. Broadbent seeks reversal of the portion of the 
Commission's Order which affirmed the ALJ's decision that Mr. 
aThe parties asked the Industrial Commission to review 
several issues, which it did, but the only issue on appeal here 
is whether the Commission and the ALJ were correct in their 
rulings on the interest issue. 
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Broadbent was entitled to interest on the permanent partial 
disability compensation from December 23, 1991, the date the 
medical panel established his impairment rating. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Mr. Broadbent was injured on October 6, 1982 in a 
work related accident, while employed by Tolboe Construction 
Company. (R. 3.) 
2. A few days after the accident, one of Mr. 
Broadbentfs doctors opined that Mr. Broadbent would be able to 
return to work after January 1983, and that it was "unknown at 
present time" whether any permanent injury or disability would 
result. (R. 4.) 
3. Mr. Broadbent returned to work in July 1983, (R. 
64), or September 1983,2 after being cleared for work as of June 
9, 1983. (R. 186.) 
4. In April 1983, Dr. Douglas Kirkpatrick opined that 
Mr. Broadbent was "about 20% disabled . . . " (R. 225.) In 
September 1984, Dr. Kirkpatrick gave Mr. Broadbent a 5% 
disability rating. (R. 231.) 
5. In May of 1987, Dr. Bruce Sorensen, one of Mr. 
Broadbent?s treating physicians, gave him a 16% disability 
rating. (R. 262.) 
2Mr. Broadbent has alternatively represented that he 
returned to work in September of 1983, (R. 10), and July of 1983, 
(R. 64). It makes no difference which date he actually returned 
to work for the issue presented here. 
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6. For various periods up to May 10, 1988, Mr. 
Broadbent was paid temporary total disability benefits in the 
total sum of $13,429.30. (R. 87, 88, 89, 91.)3 
7. On June 4, 1987, Tolboe Construction's insurer 
offered $9431.11 to Mr. Broadbent as compensation for his 
permanent partial disability. This offer was based upon Dr. 
Sorensenfs evaluation and rating of 16%.* (R. 90, 91.) 
8. Mr. Broadbent rejected the offer, and retained Dr. 
Milton Thomas to render a second opinion. (Broadbent Brief at 
4.) On February 2, 1988, Dr. Thomas opined that Mr. Broadbent 
had a 15% disability rating. (R. 286.) 
3Mr. Broadbent takes the position that he was paid temporary 
total disability only until June 1983. (Broadbent Brief at 2, 
4.) This is incorrect. Temporary total disability payments were 
made at various times through May 1988. (R. 88, 89 and 91.) 
*Again, Mr. Broadbent has misstated what transpired in this 
case. He states that, "From termination of TTD on June 9, 1983, 
until approximately August 17, 1992, (the date of payment), there 
was never a defense tender of the full amount owed." (Broadbent 
Brief at 15.) Mr. Broadbent also states that, " . . . the 
employer and his insurance cohorts can let the matter linger on 
for years, like they did here . . . " (Broadbent Brief at 14.) 
These assertions are simply incorrect. The matter lingered on 
because Mr. Broadbentfs own doctors could not agree on the 
severity or stability of his injuries and, in 1987, the insurer 
offered to pay disability benefits based upon the 16% rating 
given by Dr. Sorensen, who had treated Mr. Broadbent for four 
years. (R. 90, 91, 261, 262.) Mr. Broadbent rejected this 
offer. Mr. Broadbentfs position that the insurer's tender, which 
was based on his own doctor's evaluation was underhanded is 
incredible and contrary to the evidence. Furthermore, the 
insurer is not allowed to initiate a resolution of such disputes 
before the Industrial Commission as Mr. Broadbent suggests. 
(Broadbent Brief at 14.) 
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9. In September of 1990, Dr. John Bender opined that 
Mr. Broadbent had a 24% disability rating for physical impairment, 
and a 12% disability relative to a loss of dexterity and a tremor 
of the left hand which are apparently caused by Parkinson's 
disease. Dr. Bender also opined that "In review of these 
extensive medical records, which cover the past 8 years, it is 
apparent that Mr. Broadbent has a progressive problem which is 
undoubtedly more impaired at this time than several years ago." 
(Broadbent Brief at 4-5, R. 157, 160.) 
10. On October 2, 1990, Mr. Broadbent filed an 
Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission. (R. 10.) 
11. In December of 1990, Mr. Broadbent offered to 
settle for $21,378.38, which included $14,826.24 for the 24% 
disability found by Dr. Bender, $4953.34 for interest, $330 for 
Dr. Benderfs office visit and $1268.80 for travel expenses.5 
(R. 15-16.) 
12. On March 5, 1991, at the initial hearing on Mr. 
Broadbentfs application, it was decided that the matter would be 
referred to a medical panel after x-rays were received. (R. 19.) 
The medical panel was asked to address the following questions: 
a. Is the Parkinson's disease a result 
of the industrial accident of 10-6-82? 
5In Mr. Broadbentfs Brief, he states that he offered to 
settle for the 24% disability rating. (Broadbent Brief at 5.) 
This is incorrect. The settlement offer included amounts for 
interest, doctorfs bills and travel expenses. (R. 15-16.) 
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b. What is the permanent partial 
impairment due to the industrial accident? 
c. What is the permanent partial 
impairment due to the pre-existing conditions? 
d. Did the industrial accident 
permanently aggravate a pre-existing condition? 
(R. 41.) 
13. It took several months to gather the necessary 
x-rays for reference to the medical panel. (R. 28, 32, 36.) 
14. On December 10, 1991, the medical panel issued its 
report. The panel stated that the Parkinson's Disease was not 
the result of the industrial accident of 10/6/82, and that Mr. 
Broadbent was 23% disabled, of which 3% related to a pre-existing 
condition. (R. 44-56.) 
15. On March 9, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge 
adopted the findings of the medical panel and granted Mr. 
Broadbent relief consistent with the panelfs findings. (R. 59-
61. ) 
16. Both Mr. Broadbent and Tolboe Construction 
requested the Industrial Commission to review certain aspects of 
the ALJ's Order. (R. 64-70 and 75-80.) 
17. On May 29, 1992, the Industrial Commission 
affirmed the ALJ and found that "[t]here is substantial evidence 
in light of the entire record to uphold the findings of the ALJ, 
and his conclusions of law are appropriate under the 
circumstances. (R. 113-119; Addendum A.) 
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18. On June 25, 1992, a Petition for Review was filed 
with this court. (R. 123.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Mr. Broadbent1s interpretation of R490-1-12B.2. U.A.C. 
(1991), interest is payable on permanent partial compensation if 
the claimant's condition has stabilized, even though doctors may 
not agree on the disability rating. He argues that even though 
the doctors who evaluated him did not agree on the impairment 
rating, interest is still payable from the day following the 
termination of temporary total disability because, 
hypothetically, the rating could have been determined at that 
time. Mr. Broadbent argues that even though the many doctors who 
evaluated him from 1983 to 1991, rated him anywhere from 5% 
disabled to 34% disabled, the final rating of 23% could have been 
found in 1983 and interest should be paid from that date. Under 
this interpretation of the rule, or any other interpretation, the 
evidence does not support the relief he seeks. 
First, Mr. Broadbentfs temporary total disability payments 
did not cease until May 1988. Therefore, according to the rule, 
the earliest interest could begin to run, in any event, would be 
May 11, 1988, the day following the termination of his temporary 
benefits. R490-1-12B.2. U.A.C. (1991). Second, in September of 
1990, Dr. John Bender performed an evaluation of Mr. Broadbent at 
the request of Mr. Broadbentfs lawyer. Dr. Bender opined that 
Mr. Broadbentfs condition was becoming progressively worse. 
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Therefore, under R490-1-12B.2. Mr. Broadbentfs condition was not 
fixed for rating purposes. Dr. Bender's opinion is consistent 
with the other doctor's inability to agree on an impairment 
rating during the preceding years. Therefore, the Industrial 
Commission's award was correct, under R490-1-12B.2., and it is 
supported by the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION'S ORDER OF MAY 29, 1992, AND IT 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
A. Standard of Review. 
Mr. Broadbent argues that the issue presented is a question 
of law to which the Court employs a correction-of-error standard. 
He also argues that the Court must "closely scrutinize the 
Commission's order. (Broadbent Brief at 6.) While the first 
part of Mr. Broadbent's position is correct, as far as it goes, 
he cites no authority for the second proposition that the Court 
must "closely scrutinize" the Commission's order. 
Section 63-46b-16(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) sets 
forth the standards an appellate court must follow in reviewing 
formal adjudicative proceedings of a state agency. That section 
reads: 
The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
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(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision-making process, or has 
failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or 
were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Mr. Broadbent does not delineate which of these sections, if 
any, provide the relief he seeks. It appears Mr. Broadbent 
believes the issue is simply a question of law. Respondents 
submit the issue presented is a mixed question of law and fact. 
First, was the applicable administrative rule interpreted 
correctly and second, when was Mr. Broadbentfs condition fixed? 
Also, when did his temporary total benefits terminate? 
Therefore, the Court must accord the Commission's decision 
some deference and set it aside only if it is unreasonable. 
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Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comfn, 767 P.2d 524, 527 
(Utah 1988). The Court in Hurley explains: 
There are essentially three standards that determine 
the scope of judicial review of agency action. The 
correction-of-error standard applies to agency rulings 
on issues of law and extends no deference to agency 
rulings. An agency's findings of fact, however, are 
accorded substantial deference and will not be 
overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if 
another conclusion from the evidence is permissible. 
As to questions of mixed law and fact, a reviewing 
court usually accords an agency decision some 
deference, i.e., an agency!s decision will not be set 
aside unless the agency's conclusion is unreasonable. 
Id. at 526, 527, citations and footnotes omitted. 
In this case, the Court must also review the Commission's 
interpretation of an administrative rule. In that regard, an 
agency's interpretation of its own regulation is accorded 
judicial deference. Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. 
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982). Also, "Courts will not 
override an administrative agency's interpretation of its own 
rules unless the interpretation is obviously arbitrary or 
erroneous." McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 
P.2d 726, 730 (Utah 1963). 
The Court must also determine whether the Commission's 
factual finding relative to the date Mr. Broadbent's condition 
was fixed for rating purposes is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
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B. Question of Law. 
As is set forth above, the Court must determine if the 
Commission's interpretation of R490-1-12B.2. is obviously 
arbitrary or erroneous. R490-1-12B.2. requires, in pertinent 
part, (emphasis added): 
Permanent partial compensation shall be due and 
payable on the next day following the termination of a 
temporary total disability. However, where the 
condition is not fixed for rating purposes, the 
interest shall commence from the date the permanent 
partial impairment can be medically determined. 
Mr. Broadbent argues that the second sentence applies only 
to situations where the claimant's physical condition is not 
fixed, rather than situations where the condition is fixed but 
the rating is in dispute. Although it is not clear how the rule 
was interpreted by the Industrial Commission, its decision was 
correct under either interpretation. 
The Commission's order states: 
The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in 
ordering that interest on the PPD award commenced on 
December 23, 1991, since that was the date that the 
liability of the respondents was first medically 
determined. We agree with the respondents on this 
issue. 
(R. 114.) The Commission then cites § 35-1-78 (U.C.A.) and 
R490-1-12 and notes that there are no allegations of bad faith or 
dilatory tactics on the part of the respondents. (R. 115.) The 
6No caselaw has been found that interprets this rule. The 
cases cited by Mr. Broadbent do not address this rule and, 
therefore, do not directly address the issue before the Court. 
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Commission then concludes, "Under the circumstances, interest 
accrues from the date of December 23, 1991, as correctly 
determined by the ALJ." (Id.) It appears that the Commission 
interpreted R490-1-12B.2. to require that the impairment rating 
be fixed, rather than the condition of the claimant. 
Nevertheless, in this case, no matter which interpretation is 
correct, the result of the Commissions decision is correct and 
supported by the evidence. Mr. Broadbentfs condition was not 
fixed, according to Dr. Bender, as of late 1990, so the award of 
interest from 1991, when his disability rating was confirmed by a 
medical panel, was in accordance with R490-1-12B.2. 
Mr. Broadbent cites the case of Heaton v. Second Injury 
Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990) as support for his position. His 
reliance on that case is misplaced. Heaton was a situation where 
an injured worker had been totally disabled since he was injured 
in 1975. The issue involved interest on a permanent total 
disability award, not a permanent partial disability 
determination. Although the record in that case was, apparently, 
somewhat confusing, there was no dispute that Mr. Heaton had been 
totally disabled since his injury. Id. at 681. However, for 
some reason, Mr. Heaton was paid permanent partial disability 
compensation until October of 1981. 
In 1985, Heaton requested a clarification of his rights. 
Thereafter, Heaton applied for permanent total disability 
benefits. In November of 1985, an ALJ ordered that Heaton be 
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awarded permanent total disability benefits from July 25, 1985, 
the date Heaton1s doctor reported that Heaton had never recovered 
from the accident. In his order, however, the ALJ conceded that 
it appeared from the record that Heaton had been totally disabled 
from the date of the accident. The Industrial Commission upheld 
the ALJfs decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Commission. 
On a Writ of Certiorari, the Supreme Court of Utah held that 
Heaton was entitled to permanent total disability payments, 
including interest, from October 6, 1981, the date his permanent 
partial disability benefits expired, rather than from July, 1985. 
In its opinion, the Court states: 
Since it is clear that he [Heaton] was totally and 
permanently impaired from the time of the injury in 
1985 to the time when permanent partial payments 
terminated, he was indisputably entitled to permanent 
total benefits as of the date of the termination of the 
permanent partial benefits. 
Id. 
The significant factor in the Heaton case was that there was 
no dispute that Heaton was totally disabled since the accident 
and his condition was fixed as of that date. That case is much 
different than this case where neither the condition nor the 
rating were fixed until 1991. 
The case of Oman v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 735 P.2d 
665 (Utah App.) cert denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987), is even 
more applicable to this case. In Oman, this Court held that the 
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date of medical confirmation of a permanent total disability in 
progressive injury cases is the appropriate date for the 
commencement of such benefits. Oman sought a modification of an 
order by the Industrial Commission awarding him permanent total 
disability benefits. The Commission had ordered benefits to 
commence the date permanent total disability was first medically 
confirmed. Oman argued that benefits should commence from either 
the date of the accident or the day he last worked for his 
employer, whichever is later. This Court affirmed the Industrial 
Commissions decision and awarded Oman interest on his benefits, 
pursuant to § 35-1-78 (U.C.A.), from the date his condition was 
medically confirmed, Id. at 667. 
As in Oman, the Commissions order of May 29, 1992, which 
granted Mr. Broadbent interest from the date his condition was 
medically determined is a correct interpretation of the law. 
C. Question of fact. 
The one fact that is absolutely clear in the record in this 
case is that from 1983 until 1991, the numerous doctors who 
evaluated Mr. Broadbent could not agree as to the stability of 
his condition, nor could they agree as to the severity of his 
injuries. Mr. Broadbent correctly points out that he received at 
least the following ratings from various doctors: April 23, 1984 
(20%); September 5, 1984 (5%); May 26, 1987 (16%); February 2, 
1988 (15%); and September 18, 1990 (24%). (Broadbent Brief at 
10.) It is difficult to understand how Mr. Broadbent can assert 
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that these numbers, somehow, show that his condition was fixed as 
of June, 1983 and his permanent partial disability rating could 
have been determined at that time. 
Mr. Broadbent also claims that his temporary total 
disability payments concluded on June 10, 1983, and that his 
permanent partial compensation was, therefore, payable the 
following day. The record shows, however, that Mr. Broadbent 
received total temporary disability payments, at various times, 
up to May 10, 1988. (R. 87, 88, 89, 91.) If it is assumed that 
his condition was fixed as of that date, the earliest interest 
could be assessed in this case, is May 11, 1988, pursuant to the 
first sentence of R490-1-12B.2. 
Although Mr. Broadbent acknowledges that his impairment 
ratings were all over the board for the years 1984 through 1991, 
(Broadbent Brief at 10), he attributes this to the inability of 
doctors to agree on the rating. He argues that because he 
returned to work in 1983, his condition had stabilized as of that 
time. (Id.) He chooses to ignore the clear opinion of Dr. 
Bender that his condition had not stabilized during that time 
period. On September 18, 1990, at the request of his attorney, 
Mr. Broadbent was evaluated by Dr. John M. Bender. (R. 157.) In 
his report, Dr. Bender states, "In review of these extensive 
medical records, which cover the past 8 years, it is apparent 
that Mr. Broadbent has a progressive problem which is undoubtedly 
more impaired at this time than several years ago." (R. 157, 
-15-
emphasis added.) It is clear, through Dr. Bender, that Mr. 
Broadbent's condition was not "fixed" for rating purposes as late 
as September 1990. Therefore, under the second sentence of 
R490-1-12B,2., the Industrial Commission's decision was 
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Industrial 
Commission was correct in awarding interest from the date the 
medical panel established Mr. Broadbent!s impairment rating and, 
therefore, its order of May 29, 1992, should be affirmed. 
DATED this £l *Tday of October, 1992. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By: N t s ^ t^> 
:uart L. Poelmatn 
Ryan E. Tibbitts 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Respondents 
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ADDENDUM A 
JUN 0 1 1992 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
Fred Broadbent, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Tolboe Construction and/or 
Industrial Indemnity, 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, * 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR REVIEW AND 
DENIAL OF APPLICANT'S 
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
IN PART 
Case No. 90000918 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motions for 
Review of applicant Fred Broadbent and respondents Tolboe 
Construction and Industrial Indemnity in the above captioned 
matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and 
Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant and the respondents Tolboe Construction and/or 
Industrial Indemnity submitted Motions for Review of the 
administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision in the above captioned 
case. The applicant submitted two Motions for Review of the ALJ's 
decision of March 9, 1992, one on March 18, 1992, and the second 
one on April 6, 1992. Both were timely filed. 
The above named respondents submitted their response to 
applicant's first motion on April 8, 1992, and also, on that date 
timely submitted their Motion for Review. On April 20, 1992, the 
applicant responded to respondent's April 8, 1992 reply to 
applicant's Motion for Review, and on April 24, 1992 responded to 
respondent's Motion for Review. Respondents provided a further 
reply on May 12, 1992 to applicant's Motion for Review of April 6, 
1992. 
All parties need to be aware that responses to motions for 
review must be filed with the Commission within 15 days of the 
mailing date of the motion for review, or such responses may be 
considered untimely. U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12 (1953 as amended 
1988) . Since there were untimely responses from all parties, and 
because we have received no objections to the untimely filings, we 
will consider the responses. 
Relevant facts are as follows. The applicant sustained an 
industrial accident on October 6, 1982. Tolboe Construction and 
Industrial Indemnity paid medical expenses and temporary total 
disability benefits (TTD). The respondents claim that the 
applicant refused tender of payment for permanent partial 
disability (PPD) due to a disagreement as to the correct PPD 
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rating. The tender was made on June 4, 1987. The applicant filed 
an application for hearing in October 1990. 
In answer to the hearing application, respondents denied 
liability for PPD compensation asserting that the Industrial 
Commission of Utah (IC) is precluded from making a PPD award at any 
time subsequent to eight years after the date of the accident, and 
basing this assertion on U.C.A. Section 35-1-66. By order dated 
March 9, 1992, the ALJ awarded the applicant PPD benefits, but did 
not address the eight year limitation provision contained in the 
statute. 
Because of a series of disputes between the parties, and among 
the physicians, as to the proper PPD rating, the ALJ referred this 
case to a medical panel. On December 10, 1991, the panel awarded 
the applicant a 23 percent impairment rating. The ALJ adopted the 
medical panel impairment rating of 2 3 percent, and ordered that the 
applicant's compensation be paid in a lump sum plus interest of 
eight percent from December 23, 1991. 
The only issue raised in applicant's Motion for Review dated 
March 18, 1992 was whether the date of December 23, 1991 was the 
proper date for the interest to begin accrual. The applicant 
contends that interest should begin on June 9, 1983 which is the 
day after the date upon which the applicant's TTD was terminated. 
Alternatively, the applicant argues that if the Commission decides 
that the interest should not begin on that date, the interest 
clearly should begin on April 23, 1984 which is the date that the 
applicant met the standard for a permanent partial impairment 
rating of 20 percent. 
The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in ordering 
that interest on the PPD award commenced on December 23, 1991 since 
that was the date that the liability of the respondents was first 
medically determined. We agree with the respondents on this issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the rationale behind the 
award of interest on workers compensation benefits: 
Thus, it is clear that compensation for worker 
disability is legislation for the public wel-
fare. It is also clear that the statute pro-
viding for interest on unpaid benefits was a 
legislative attempt to remedy a serious social 
problem: the depreciation of the value of bene-
fits as a result of non-receipt of the weekly 
benefit for months, or perhaps years, until a 
final determination of eligibility and an award 
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was made. 
Marshall 'v. Ind. Comm'n, 704 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1985). 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-78 provides in pertinent part: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall in-
clude interest at the rate of 8% per annum from 
the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. 
1953 as amended 1981. 
Further, our rules state that: 
For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits 
shall become "due and payable" (as used in Section 
35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows: 
• * * 
2. Permanent partial compensation shall be 
due and payable on the next day follow-
ing the termination of a temporary total 
disability. However, where the condition 
is not fixed for rating purposes, the in-
terest shall commence from the date the 
permanent partial impairment can be medi-
cally determined. 
Emphasis added; Rule 490-1-12 (Utah Admin. Code 1991). 
There has been no allegation by the applicant of bad faith or 
dilatory tactics on the part of the respondents in paying the 
interest. Our decision on the award of interest may be different 
in cases where the employer cannot show that it proceeded with some 
dispatch to provide payments to injured employees who were entitled 
to such payments. 
Under the circumstances, interest accrues from the date of 
December 23, 1991 as correctly determined by the ALJ. 
The applicant in his Motion for Review dated April 6, 1992 
also argues that he has never received reimbursement for his 
travel. The ALJ Order is silent as to this issue, and the 
respondents' reply to applicant's motion argues that the Order did 
not contain any consideration of the mileage claim because the 
applicant did not submit itemized information reflecting the 
particular amounts of mileage expense claimed for the various 
periods involved to the ALJ as the ALJ had ordered. The applicant 
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has not responded to this allegation of respondents so we will 
treat this statement by the respondents as true for purpose of our 
decision. 
The current pertinent rule which was effective on March 16, 
192 provides that: 
An employee who, based upon his/her physi-
cian's advice, requires hospital, medical, 
surgical, or consultant services for in-
juries arising out of and in the course of 
employment and who is authorized by the 
self-insurer, the carrier, or the Industrial 
Commission to obtain such services from a 
physician and or hospital shall be entitled 
to [certain reimbursements]. 
R568-2-19A (Utah Admin. Code 1992). 
The rule further provides that n[r]equests for travel 
reimbursement must be submitted to the carrier for payment within 
one year of the authorized care. R568-2-19B4 (Utah Admin. Code 
1992) . Therefore, such mileage reimbursement requests are 
authorized under the current rule as an expense which can be passed 
on to the carrier or employer unless the employee does not submit 
such request for reimbursement within one year of the authorized 
care. 
The applicant does not fall under the current rule since he 
was injured in 1982, and since he clearly filed his application 
before the effective date of the new rule. Therefore, the 
requirement that the applicant submit his requests for travel 
reimbursement to the carrier within one year of the authorized care 
will apply in his case only to those medical treatments, and other 
circumstances within the mileage reimbursement rule which were 
incurred subsequent to March 15, 1992. 
Carriers should not impose rigid and onerous requirements on 
injured employees to prove mileage expenses. Such requirements are 
contrary to the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. However, 
the carrier may reasonably require the injured employee to show 
that he/she attended a medical appointment or other required 
treatment along with a statement from the injured employee showing 
the mileage from the home/work of the employee to the place of 
treatment and return. 
Rather than the carrier simply stating that the burden has not 
been met, it is incumbent upon the carrier to tell the employee 
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precisely what will be reasonably needed to substantiate the 
reimbursement. Preferably this should be discussed, among such 
items as how the claim will be processed, early in the process when 
the carrier assigns an adjuster to the case. Such a discussion 
will avoid much of the contention presented by arguments over 
mileage as presented in this case. 
We do not have sufficient information on which to approve or 
disapprove applicant's claim for mileage in this case. The 
applicant has provided us with a list of the mileage amounts 
claimed for the various years. Had the applicant provided this 
list more punctually, it could have been considered by the ALJ. 
However, in the interest of conserving time, we will dispose of 
this issue. 
The carrier must do more than say that the amounts are old and 
unsubstantiated. The applicant has listed the day, month, and year 
for most of his trips, the medical practitioner or facility 
visited, and the number of miles. The carrier presumably has the 
medical records and bills which it paid to verify these trips. It 
would seem that sufficient information has been provided on which 
the carrier can determine the claim. Since the applicant was late 
turning in his claim, the carrier will have ten days from the 
issuance of our order in which to provide us more information about 
its specific objections, and about what it needs in the way of 
substantiation which are not within its records of the case, or we 
will approve the amounts claimed. 
The remaining issue to be discussed, and which is the only 
issue raised by the respondents in their Motion for Review is 
whether U.C.A. Section 35-1-66 of the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act prohibits the Commission from making an award to the applicant 
of permanent partial disability after eight years from the date of 
applicant's injury. 
The statute in question reads: 
The Commission may make a permanent partial 
disability award at any time prior to eight 
years after the date of injury to an em-
ployee whose physical condition resulting 
from such injury is not finally healed and 
fixed eight years after the date of the in-
jury and who files an application for such 
purpose prior to the expiration of such 
eight-year period. 
Emphasis added. (1953 as amended 1981). 
The ALJ Issued his decision more than nine years after the 
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date of injury. This precludes the Commission from ordering the 
respondents to pay an award of permanent partial disability to the 
applicant argue the respondents. To buttress this argument, the 
respondents further contend that the delay in seeking the 
Commission's award was caused by the applicant. 
The vise of the word "may11 clearly shows that the Commission is 
not required to make such award within the eight year period, 
although it may do so. This particular statute is applicable to 
those situations where the applicant's condition has not 
stabilized, but the applicant desires that his medical condition be 
rated even though under normal circumstances no rating would be 
provided until stabilization. Under these circumstances, such 
applicant can force a rating if requested prior to the expiration 
of the eight year period. 
In this case, the applicant clearly filed his application 
before the eight year period. 
For these reasons, the Commission affirms the ALJ's decision. 
There is substantial evidence in light of the entire record to 
uphold the findings of the ALJ, and his conclusions of law are 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated March 9, 1992 is affirmed. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the respondents shall have ten 
days from the date of issuance of this Order to provide to the 
Commission any specific objections to the mileage reimbursement 
request shown at Exhibit A, Applicant's Motion for Review filed on 
April 6, 1992. The applicant shall have ten days from the date of 
service upon him to respond to respondent's objections, if any. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 3 5-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
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transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
.'ill. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Certified this ^ ^ d a y of )^)<z_^ 
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